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SIMONE WEIL’S SPIRITUAL CRITIQUE OF MODERN
SCIENCE: AN HISTORICAL-CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
by Joseph K. Cosgrove
Abstract. Simone Weil is widely recognized today as one of the
profound religious thinkers of the twentieth century. Yet while her
interpretation of natural science is critical to Weil’s overall under-
standing of religious faith, her writings on science have received little
attention compared with her more overtly theological writings. The
present essay, which builds on Vance Morgan’s Weaving the World:
Simone Weil on Science, Necessity, and Love (2005), critically examines
Weil’s interpretation of the history of science. Weil believed that
mathematical science, for the ancient Pythagoreans a mystical ex-
pression of the love of God, had in the modern period degenerated
into a kind of reification of method that confuses the means of repre-
senting nature with nature itself. Beginning with classical (Newto-
nian) science’s representation of nature as a machine, and even more
so with the subsequent assimilation of symbolic algebra as the princi-
pal language of mathematical physics, modern science according to
Weil trades genuine insight into the order of the world for symbolic
manipulation yielding mere predictive success and technological domi-
nation of nature. I show that Weil’s expressed desire to revive a
Pythagorean scientific approach, inspired by the “mysterious com-
plicity” in nature between brute necessity and love, must be recast in
view of the intrinsically symbolic character of modern mathematical
science. I argue further that a genuinely mystical attitude toward na-
ture is nascent within symbolic mathematical science itself.
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In an entry from her Marseilles notebooks, Simone Weil remarks that “not
much would be required (yet a lot in a certain sense) to bring us back from
contemporary science to an equivalent of Greek science” (Weil 1956, 69).
What would be required is a return to a mystically oriented science on the
model of the ancient Pythagoreans. For such a science, mathematics in its
“mysterious appropriateness” serves as a bridge, or metaxu, between God
and humanity (p. 514).
Much would be required to reorient science in this way, because metaxu
require of us a recognition of connections we are loath to make. “We hate
the people who try to make us form the connections we do not want to
form,” Weil remarks in another notebook entry (p. 349), and this is as true
of science and technology as of any other sphere of human life. A bridge
between ourselves and God threatens us with the truth about what we are
in relation to God, and to avoid this truth we make idols of the bridges
themselves. This, according to Weil, is what modern science, especially
twentieth-century science, has done.
Scholarship on Weil’s philosophy of science has taken a significant step
forward with the appearance of Vance Morgan’s Weaving the World: Simone
Weil on Science, Mathematics, and Love (2005).1 Morgan’s aim is essentially
expository, however, and his work calls for a critical assessment of Weil’s
thought on science. The present essay is an initial attempt, from a perspec-
tive sympathetic with Weil, at such an assessment.
Weil’s critique of modern science consists of two parts, the first directed
at classical (Newtonian) science, the latter at contemporary science, espe-
cially twentieth-century relativity and quantum mechanics. In each, Weil
detects a species of thoughtlessness or failure of that prayerful attention
that marks all genuine study and intellectual accomplishment. As regards
classical science, Weil’s objection is specifically focused on the manner in
which it undermines the human encounter with beauty through work.
Classical science, by conceiving nature as merely a machine, to which hu-
man beings can relate only as slave or master, not as loving participants
through work, is fundamentally incompatible with beauty as a revelation
of divine love.
The assimilation of algebra by mathematical physics, a process span-
ning the eighteenth and extending into the nineteenth century, exacer-
bates the implicit thoughtlessness of classical science by subordinating
scientific cognition to symbolic formulae increasingly devoid of insight. In
the process, a genuine encounter with natural necessity, revelatory of di-
vine providence, is lost to science. Symbolic or algebraic physics represents
the collectivization of thought, as it were, where science itself is rendered a
technique of knowledge production and thought ceases to be the activity
of any responsible individual. “The number 2 thought of by one man,”
remarks Weil, “cannot be added to the number 2 thought of by another
man so as to make up the number 4” (Weil 1958, 82). This process reaches
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its logical conclusion in twentieth-century physics, where science is re-
duced finally to a form of symbolic manipulation the only value of which
is predictive success and technological domination of nature.
Although Weil’s philosophy of science is in my view startlingly insight-
ful, I believe she is at once too optimistic and too pessimistic about mod-
ern science: too optimistic because she underestimates how much would
be required to reorient science toward the mystical, and too pessimistic in
that she reproves modern science for sins of which it is not guilty, at least
not in the way or to the degree she maintains. These twin shortcomings
seem to stem from misreadings of the history of science on Weil’s part. She
evidently forecloses the possibility that the symbolic form of representa-
tion might be intrinsic to mathematical science, as opposed to a merely
convenient shorthand for quantitative relationships that could, and ideally
should, be conceived nonsymbolically.2 This assumption renders her in-
sufficiently sensitive to the intractability of the symbolic collectivization of
thought in contemporary civilization. Moreover, to a significant degree
she conflates twentieth-century physics itself, specifically relativity and quan-
tum mechanics, and textbook versions designed to initiate prospective sci-
entists in the mathematical techniques of the theories. In so doing she
creates the erroneous impression that in these theories genuine thought
has been virtually replaced by mathematical technique. This makes her
unnecessarily pessimistic about the spiritual prospects for science.
My aim, however, is not to find fault with Weil’s philosophy of science
but rather to make a modest contribution to bringing it to bear upon our
present situation. I believe that if we do not correct these misreadings of
the history of science, we shall not be able to avail ourselves of Weil’s pro-
found reflections on the spiritual malaise of our increasingly scientifically
and technologically driven civilization.
SCIENCE AND NUMBER MYSTICISM
Weil’s philosophy of science takes its inspiration from Pythagorean num-
ber mysticism. Mysticism in general for Weil is defined by a kind of move-
ment through contradiction or paradox that finally transcends, while not
resolving, the opposition constituting the paradox. Only at the point where
the intellect exhausts itself in the attempt to resolve contradiction has it
reached the threshold to a mystical revelation of divine truth. A mystical
relationship to the physical cosmos is specifically characterized by the op-
position it embodies between the impersonal and the personal or intelli-
gent. That is to say, the physical cosmos embodies the paradox of necessity
or impersonal intelligence.
Weil evidently first encountered this notion of necessity in the Greek
Stoics, who reinterpreted moira, or “fate,” as divine providence. Necessity,
a blind mechanism somehow infinitely more than blind, renders the cos-
mos beautiful, an object of love: “We are ruled by a double law,” Weil
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observes, “an obvious indifference and a mysterious complicity, as regards
the good, on the part of the matter which composes the world; it is be-
cause it reminds us of this double law that the spectacle of beauty pierces
the heart” (1968, 12).
To grasp the truth of mathematics, we must bow to that impersonal
necessity which defines relationships between numbers (there is “no ‘I’ in
numbers,” Weil remarks in one of her notebook entries [1956, 191]).3 Yet
at the same time the very absence of any arbitrariness in mathematics be-
speaks a principle of intelligence, or logos. This paradox makes mathemat-
ics mysterious and beautiful—and it makes mathematical science a form
of loving obedience to the divine logos.
From the perspective of Weil’s analysis, it is no accident that we find
among the great architects of seventeenth-century mechanics, a science
founded under the banner of mastery of nature and the rational transpar-
ency of corporeal being, no number mystics.4 Galileo, for instance, asserts
that within the domain of mathematics, human understanding is equal to
God (Galileo 1967, 103). Presumably mathematical necessity is no mys-
tery to God. Descartes goes further, maintaining that the truths of math-
ematics are a product of divine fiat, seemingly necessary to us, but in
themselves solely contingent upon the divine will (Descartes 1985–91, III:
23; letter to Mersenne of 15 April 1630). Descartes thus forecloses entirely
the impersonal dimension of mathematical necessity and in so doing dis-
solves the mysteriousness of mathematics. In general, classical science based
itself from the beginning on an idea of method as control of the cognitive
encounter with nature according to the demands of the autonomous hu-
man intellect. Such an approach is deeply hostile to a mystical view, where
the human knower is always in some way dependent upon the self-disclo-
sure of the thing known.
The historical origins of modern science thus raise the question of
whether a mystical reorientation of science of the kind Weil envisions is
possible within the Western scientific tradition. It certainly cannot be sim-
ply assumed that it is, that we could somehow rid science of its spiritually
disagreeable elements while retaining our electric lights, cell phones, and
broadband Internet connections. If it is not possible, Weil is surely wrong
to say that not much would be required to reorient science on the model of
the Greeks.
Although there is little chance of my succeeding where Weil at least
partially failed, some philosophical observations regarding the historical
implications of her spiritual critique of science may be worthwhile.
CLASSICAL SCIENCE AND WORK
In her early treatment of classical science, the dissertation Science and Per-
ception in Descartes (1987), Weil descries an essential connection between
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mathematical physics and work. Genuine knowledge of the world, she
argues, as opposed to uncontrolled imaginings of it, requires that our in-
tellect come into indirect contact with the material universe through our
bodies, pressing on the world, as it were, and feeling it press back. Such a
pressing on something that presses back is work, or physical labor. Work
reaches its effect, however, only by conforming to geometry (a fact that
receives a kind of general mathematical expression, one might say, in
Newton’s law of action/reaction5), for by working I make myself part of a
machine, the successful operation of which is governed by geometrical prin-
ciples (1987, 82). When I dig in the garden, for instance, I make myself
part of a lever. Work, like the science of geometry, but also via the geom-
etry of nature conceived as a machine, thus puts us in touch with necessity.
Machines work only because nature is governed by mathematical neces-
sity, a necessity I feel in the ache and fatigue of my muscles when I work.
In view of the primacy of physical work in focusing our attention, such
that we attain to genuine perception of the world as opposed to a dream-
like state fabricated by the imagination, what is the purpose of science,
which seems by its very nature to break the connection between physical
labor and perception of the world? Science is needed to master the imagi-
nation in the latter’s propensity to run itself beyond that limited section of
the world that can be perceived through individual work. That is to say,
science is necessary, as Weil puts it, to teach us that when we are not work-
ing, the understanding of the world that we had when we were working is
all there is (1987, 85–86). By this means science disciplines the imagina-
tion, focusing the attention in a manner analogous to physical labor.
Indeed, intellectual labor, on Weil’s account, is of value solely through
its analogy to physical labor, for in intellectual labor we come into contact
indirectly (via mathematics, for instance) with that necessity with which
we come into contact directly through physical labor. In whatever way Weil’s
understanding of the spiritual significance of physical labor changes in
subsequent years—her recognition and first-hand experience of its poten-
tially brutalizing side, for example—this remains constant: that contem-
plation of truth is essentially tied to physical labor, the kind that enters the
body as fatigue or even pain. As Weil famously asserts in the final sentence
of The Need for Roots, physical labor is the spiritual core of human life
(1952, 288).6
We must therefore understand Weil’s objections to classical science in
terms of the specific metaphor of work the latter uses to understand na-
ture. Classical mechanics conceives nature as a working machine. Weil
rightly observes, for instance, that the concept of energy is entirely depen-
dent upon the metaphor of work (1968, 6–8).7 Yet, in this conception of
work, one of the terms defining the paradox of necessity has fallen away.
Classical mechanics conceives nature as only a blind, deterministic mecha-
nism, whereas work involves effort, aspiration, hope, contingency. In this
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way, the metaphor of work in classical mechanics loses its basis in the na-
ture of things. The situation is not at all altered by the “craftsman God” of
seventeenth-century philosophy, skilled artificer whose universe runs itself
like a well-designed watch. As Weil remarks, “There is no question, of
course, of imagining any sort of wills at work behind the phenomena of
nature because these would not be analogous to human wills. . . . they
would be exempt from the conditions of work” (1968, 6). Thus the uni-
verse conceived as a working machine is not a spiritual laborer, as it were,
but rather a slave, as Descartes intended when he said that his new science
would make us the “masters and possessors of nature” (Descartes 1985–
91, I:142–43). Moreover, the human laborer is himself rendered a slave,
since matter as conceived by classical science is straightforwardly indiffer-
ent to our desires, hopes, and aspirations. That indifference is true enough,
but the description becomes false by losing all correlation to its opposite,
the providential necessity or divine logos of which the Stoics could with
love sing, “Lead me, Destiny, and I will follow.” In modern science, says
Weil, there is simply nothing to love.
Classical science’s attempt to dissolve the mystery of necessity by focus-
ing exclusively on one of its poles (deterministic causality) at the expense
of the other (love, or the transcendent logos) bears the mark of a kind of
“reification of method,” in which the means of representation is taken for
the reality represented. Indeed, Weil’s analysis is reminiscent of Edmund
Husserl’s in The Crisis of the European Sciences:
Mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, or the garb of symbols
of the symbolic mathematical theories, encompasses everything which, for scien-
tists and the educated generally, represents the life-world, dresses it up as “objec-
tively actual and true” nature. It is through the garb of ideas that we take for true
being what is actually a method. (Husserl 1970, 51)8
Weil remarks similarly,
The process of calculation places the signs in relation to one another on the sheet
of paper, without the objects so signified being in relation in the mind; with the
result that the actual question of the significance of signs ends by no longer pos-
sessing any meaning. One thus finds oneself in the position of having solved a
problem by a species of magic, without the mind having connected the data with
the solution. Consequently, here again, as in the case of the automatic machine,
method seems to have material objects as its sphere instead of mind; only, in this
case, the material objects are not pieces of metal, but marks made on white paper.
(Weil 1958, 94)
The ensuing adoption of algebra or symbolic mathematics as the exclusive
language of modern mathematical physics thus will be, in Weil’s view, the
very example of that reification of method nascent in classical science from
the beginning.
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SCIENCE AND ALGEBRA
Weil associates the spiritual malaise of modern science with the advent of
modern algebra in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and its assimila-
tion into physics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Algebra, she
maintains, substitutes technique for genuine insight into necessity. Blindly
manipulating symbols increasingly devoid of any discernible physical mean-
ing, science trades truth for mere predictive success and power. In classical
science prior to the latter half of the nineteenth and especially the twenti-
eth century, however, the algebraic formulae could still be correlated with
imaginable physical mechanisms such that the connection between sci-
ence and work was not entirely broken. But with relativity and quantum
mechanics in the twentieth century, she believes, the connection has bro-
ken down completely.
To better appreciate Weil’s objections to algebraic physics, consider the
classical formula for kinetic energy: E = mv2/2. No insight into the laws of
nature is required to manipulate such a formula. One need only “plug in”
the values of the variables m and v respectively and apply the rules of alge-
braic calculation. Moreover, there exists a prima facie incoherence in mul-
tiplying together the two heterogeneous quantities mass and velocity. How
are we to “cash in,”9 as it were, such a formula in the real world, the world
in which we live our lives? For Weil, all such valid formulas should in
principle be interpretable as proportions, subject to representation in the
imagination, between intuitively evident physical quantities. Thus the equa-
tion E = mv2/2 would be regarded as symbolic shorthand for an intuitive
representation in terms of the amount of work (force acting through a
distance) required to accelerate the body to velocity v. As long as a concrete
insight of this kind into natural necessity is attained, there is no harm in
employing the symbolic formula. Symbolic physics becomes spiritually de-
structive, however, when formulas begin to replace insight. For now the laws
governing the physical universe can only appear arbitrary, with the beauti-
ful Pythagorean and Stoic cosmos degenerating into a mere mathematico-
empirical “system” unfit to bear witness to the divine logos.
Weil’s analysis of the role of algebra in modern physics, however, is not
entirely adequate.10 Algebra in its modern incarnation is far more than sim-
ply a powerful technique that as such continually runs the risk of substi-
tuting blind manipulation of symbols for genuine insight. To be sure, this
is one feature of algebra, but it is of secondary importance to modern
science. Of primary importance, as the historical investigations of Jacob
Klein demonstrate, is that algebra alters the very intelligibility of number
by reconstituting number as an essentially symbolic entity.11 In its modern
algebraic conception, number is no longer merely an abstraction from ex-
perienced nature but rather a symbolic construction, itself a technological
artifact if you will. For modern mathematics, that is to say (to appropriate
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in slightly altered form a quip attributed to the American logician W. V.
Quine), to be a number is to be the possible value of an algebraic variable.
Correspondingly, modern mathematical or algebraic physics reconstitutes
nature itself as a symbolic entity. Indeed, science and technology in the sense
we use those terms today are possible solely on the basis of this symbolic
reinterpretation of nature.
As Klein points out, the Greek conception of number, regnant in the
West until the late sixteenth century, was abstract but not symbolic. I can
form an abstract idea of “3,” for instance, via repeated encounters with
three apples, three oranges, three people, three cars, and so forth. “3” means
the apples, oranges, people, or cars. I cannot similarly abstract the idea of
“–3,” because there exist in nature no countable collections (or “multi-
tudes of units,” after Euclid) of “negative-three things” from which such
an idea could be abstracted. “–3” rather designates a symbolic entity, “the
number negative-three” itself. Only indirectly does it refer to anything in
nature. And on the modern conception of number, this is just as true of
“3” and all other numbers. In this way we can distinguish between an
abstract and a symbolic conception of number. Irrational numbers, for
instance, are possible only as symbolic entities.12 The Greek conception of
number, by contrast, is determined by an abstract but essentially natural
intelligibility. That is true even of the so-called algebraic mathematics of
Diophantus, which employs symbolic variables (Klein 1968, 126–49).
These variables always designate merely unknown collections of countable
units, never symbolically conceived numbers.
The use of symbolic algebra in physics would therefore appear problem-
atic prima facie, because the science of physics claims to be “about” the
physical world itself rather than about a symbolic entity. Indeed, for a
century or so after Newton, mathematical physicists resisted the use of
algebra, none more so perhaps than Newton himself, and for the very rea-
son of the felt need to keep symbolic and physical quantities conceptually
distinct. Mathematical physics instead employed the traditional language
of ratio and proportion. At some point in the nineteenth century, the equa-
tions of physics generally ceased to be understood as abbreviated propor-
tions and began to be taken instead as direct assertions about the physical
world. Thus we today think of a body’s energy as itself “being” mc2, even
though we have no intuitive conception of the product of mass and veloc-
ity. The training of scientists undoubtedly encourages this kind of reifica-
tion of symbolic mathematical entities, and Weil is therefore right to see in
it the danger of a science that does not actually think. Beyond that, how-
ever, Weil seems to assume that any valid formula of physics should in
principle be redeemable as a proportion involving intuitable physical quan-
tities. “Science,” she maintains, “has as its object the study and the theo-
retical reconstruction of the order of the world—the order of the world in
relation to the mental, psychic, and bodily structure of man. Contrary to
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22 xy +
the naïve illusions of certain scholars, neither the use of telescopes and
microscopes, nor the employment of the most unusual algebraic formu-
lae . . . will allow it to get beyond the limits of this structure” (1951, 169).
But if this assumption was true for mathematical physics at least well into
the nineteenth century, it is no longer true.
In Hermann Minkowski’s “spacetime” formulation of Einstein’s special
theory of relativity, first set forth in 1908, an invariant quantity designated
the “spacetime interval” is defined for any two events: s2 = (ct)2 – x2 (where
s is the spacetime interval, t is the time interval between the events, x is the
distance between the events, and c is a constant, the velocity of light in
empty space).13 Of course, since ct has units of distance, the literal mean-
ing of c2t2 – x2 is simply the difference between the distance separating two
events and the distance light would travel in the time interval between the
two events.14 But if we represent time in terms of ct, the expression can be
understood as a “spacetime interval” via an analogy with a rotation of co-
ordinate axes in Euclidean space, where the distance between two points
on a Cartesian plane is given by the Pythagorean theorem: s =  x2 + y2.
Representing ct and x on respective axes of a Cartesian plane, we can per-
form a “hyperbolic rotation,” in which angles are measured on arcs of a
hyperbola rather than arcs of a circle as in regular trigonometry (Fig. 1).
The hyperbolic rotation does in fact yield the relativistic expression
s2 = (ct)2 – x2.15 If we then set c equal to unity and drop its units (distance
per unit time), such that ct = 1t or simply t, substitution into the original
expression yields t – x2 as the “spacetime interval.”
Clearly, because t now designates time, the subtraction is intuitively
meaningless. The operation can still be carried out, however, if we perform
it on symbolic, dimensionless numbers and then “plug” the result back
into units of “spacetime.” Observe that to carry out the “spacetime” sub-
traction, we first had to convert c, the velocity of light, into the symbolic
and dimensionless number “1,” and then drop the dimensions of t and x
respectively.16 Consequently, save for the symbolic conception of number
uncovered by Klein, the very mathematical operations by which the
Fig. 1. The distance between the origin and point P in diagram (a) is invari-
ant. Similarly, the space-time “interval” between the event at the origin and event
P in diagram (b) is invariant.
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spacetime interval is defined would be impossible.  Here, that is to say, the
symbolic form of representation cannot be intuitively redeemed even indi-
rectly. Rather, the “spacetime interval” is an irreducibly symbolic entity.
If four-dimensional “spacetime” is devoid of intuitive sense, by contrast
with the three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time of experience,
why should it be accepted as real? The answer, in short, is that the concept
of spacetime is an inevitable result of recognition in mathematical physics
of the relativity of particular reference frames for measuring space and time.
Thus Minkowski characterizes the theory of spacetime as the “postulate of
the absolute world” (1952, 83). Such reasoning, we shall see, cannot simply
be dismissed as thoughtless manipulation of algebraic symbols. At the same
time, there is no denying that the Minkowski approach leaves us with the
sense that “things” have somehow been replaced by relations among symbols.
Weil evinces a clear sense for this aspect of modern science when she
comments, for instance, that in modern science order as expressed in alge-
braic symbols has become “a thing instead of an idea” (Weil 1965, letter to
Alain of 1933), and that algebra “puts everything on the same level,” since
“things, once translated into letters, play an equal role in equations” (Weil
1968, 54). Indeed, for Weil, the deleterious effects of “algebraic conscious-
ness” extend beyond mathematical physics per se. For in the contemporary
world such consciousness has become socially reified, as it were, such that
thought itself is now essentially “without a thinker”:
In all spheres, thought, the prerogative of the individual, is subordinated to the
vast mechanisms which crystallize collective life, and that is so to such an extent
that we have almost lost the notion of what real thought is . . . signs, words, and
algebraic formulae in the field of knowledge, money and credit symbols in eco-
nomic life, play the part of realities of which the actual things themselves consti-
tute only the shadows, exactly as in Hans Anderson’s tale in which the scientist
and his shadow exchange roles. . . . (Weil 1958, 93)
The reification of method, so compelling in the lone Cartesian thinker
or ego cogito, and so productive in mathematical physics, evidently has
destructive consequences when embodied in social structures. The archi-
tects of seventeenth-century mechanics knew that algebraic formulae could
not be simply read into nature. However, to the degree that a symbolic
system of thought becomes socially reified, such that the thoughts of indi-
vidual thinkers themselves are essentially constituted by the system itself,
there is no truly individual thought remaining by which such a reification
of technique could be even recognized.
For Weil, the reification of technique represents an abdication of indi-
vidual thought and responsibility. But she further suggests that algebra
could be relegated in science itself to the status of a “mere instrument”
(Weil 1965, 3), an aid to the imagination in conceiving analogies (propor-
tions). In other words, if algebra is reified technique, we should dereify it.
Here, however, Weil underestimates the hurdles for a reorientation of sci-
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ence along the lines of Pythagorean number mysticism. As we have seen,
in the context of modern mathematical science, there is no way of dereifying
algebraic technique, at least not in the way Weil suggests. That could be
done only by abandoning modern science per se, since in modern science
algebraic entities are indeed “the thing.” To be sure, in some sense Weil did
wish for contemporary science to be, if not abandoned, at least conceptu-
ally reformulated at its very root. Whether that desire is justifiable is a
question to which we presently turn.
CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE AND NUMBER MYSTICISM
Twentieth-century science introduces symbolic theoretical entities in prin-
ciple incapable of being represented by the imagination, for example the
“wave-particles” of quantum mechanics or the “curved space-time” of
Einstein’s general theory of relativity. For Weil, such a severing of ties be-
tween science and the imagination is symptomatic of something deeper
and in itself more troubling: a hostility to thought itself, evinced in what
she refers to in one passage as a “contempt for the principle of non-contra-
diction” (Weil 1951, 169). This contempt serves as a barometer, as it were,
of the basic thoughtlessness of contemporary science. It represents more
specifically a failure of the vital faculty of attention, for Weil the only spiri-
tual resource that human beings ultimately could be said to possess. Atten-
tion, in the most fundamental sense, is a form of obedience to God. In her
essay on school studies, Weil maintains that the key to a correct concep-
tion of intellectual endeavor is the realization that “prayer consists of at-
tention.” Therefore, “although people seem to be unaware of it today, the
development of the faculty of attention forms the real object and almost
the sole interest of studies” (1951, 105).
Weil’s understanding of the spiritual significance of attention brings into
focus her objection to the reification of technique in contemporary science
and in contemporary culture in general. The reification of technique un-
dermines the cultivation of attention and in so doing makes modern hu-
manity unfit for prayer. In the specific context of science, it renders us
unfit for an encounter with the beauty of the world possible only through
a grasp of the paradox of necessity, the mysterious complicity between
brute necessity and love. Contemporary science, on this interpretation,
merely ushers to its logical conclusion a process of reification begun in
classical science. Classical science, in the interest of Cartesian “mastery of
nature,” discarded the discontinuous, that which cannot be rendered un-
der a concept of deterministic causality. Twentieth-century science pro-
ceeded to jettison continuity as well, leaving a kind of esoteric and “magical”
science celebrated by the lay public precisely to the degree of its impen-
etrability.17 Thus the college physics student who asks how light can be
both a wave and a particle, or how it can have the same velocity with
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respect to two observers in relative motion, is liable to be told, “That’s just
the way it is,” and expected to accept such a response with a kind of dazzled
admiration.
There is no denying, it seems to me, the spiritual impoverishment Weil
describes; it is definitive of contemporary scientific and technological cul-
ture. But is this impoverishment intrinsically related to specific contempo-
rary scientific theories? This question is paramount, because it is one thing
to diagnose a malady of institutional science and its system of education
and quite another to indict contemporary science as such. The latter clearly
leaves us in a much more pessimistic situation.
According to Weil, Einstein, in his special theory of relativity, simply
translated two logically incompatible principles (the light postulate and
the principle of relativity18) into algebraic formulae and then united them
“as if they could . . . be simultaneously true, and derived equations from
them” (Weil 1968, 49). But this is precisely what Einstein did not do, as is
clear from the philosophical section of his paper on relativity (Einstein
[1905] 1952).19 Einstein arrived at his physical ideas not via thoughtless
manipulation of algebraic symbols but rather via probably the most philo-
sophically rigorous reflection on space and time since Leibniz in the late
seventeenth century. Admittedly, one would not know it from many text-
book accounts of relativity, which merely present the mathematical tech-
niques of the theory. Einstein himself, however, demonstrated logically
that the evident incompatibility of the invariability of the velocity of light
and the principle of relativity rests on an invalid assumption in Newtonian
physics regarding the absolutivity of space and time. His reflection on our
intuitive knowledge of simultaneity resolves the contradiction while at the
same time yielding insight into a mysterious and beautiful “complicity” in
the very heart of nature, a preestablished harmony, if you will, between the
demand for an absolute of thought (the velocity of light as a law of nature)
and the world of empirical observation.20 In no way does Einstein merely
force together algebraically two conceptually incompatible principles.
A similar assessment obtains as regards Weil’s objection to the quantiza-
tion of energy in twentieth-century physics. Weil’s objection to quantum
mechanics is not the reintroduction of discontinuity per se but rather the
manner in which discontinuity is reintroduced, namely, by simply forcing
it together algebraically with the incompatible concept of energy, an essen-
tially continuous quantity.21 Contrary to Weil’s analysis, we might observe
that continuous space and time are themselves philosophically problem-
atic, as the Greeks knew, and that classical science’s conception of spa-
tiotemporal continuity is arguably itself a mathematical idealization, as
Leibniz pointed out. Current string theory, in fact, entertains the possibil-
ity that space and time are quantized, thus removing (should string theory
be confirmed) the apparent conflict between the continuity of space and
time and the existence of quanta.22
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My purpose in discussing these examples is neither to absolve contem-
porary science nor to dismiss Weil’s valid criticisms but rather to point out
that Weil’s charge of thoughtlessness against relativity and quantum me-
chanics is in some degree unfair—if not to institutionalized science and its
system of education, at least to the creators of the theories. Had Weil lived
long enough to study twentieth-century physics in greater depth, she would
undoubtedly have revised her assessment. To be sure, it is a serious and
damaging thing that prospective scientists are often or even typically initi-
ated into their specialties via mathematical techniques divorced from genu-
ine insight into natural phenomena. Fortunately, there are resources within
contemporary science for overcoming this (having students read Einstein’s
scientific papers themselves, for example).
Indeed, Einstein is arguably the greatest number mystic in the history
of science since the Pythagoreans. Reflecting on the vocation of the physi-
cist, he avers that
physical theory has two ardent desires, to gather up as far as possible all pertinent
phenomena and their connections, and to help us know not only how nature is
and how her transactions are carried through, but also to reach as far as possible
the perhaps utopian and seemingly arrogant aim of knowing why nature is thus
and not otherwise. Here lies the highest satisfaction of a scientific person . . . [that]
one experiences, so to speak, that God Himself could not have arranged those
connections in any other way than which factually exists, any more than it would
be in His power to make the number 4 into a prime number. (quoted in Holton
1972, 366–67)
Einstein accordingly emphasizes that his general principle of relativity “im-
plies the necessity of the law of the equality of inertial and gravitational
mass” (1961, 69).23 On this basis one could hope that the law of universal
gravitation could be derived purely theoretically, a hope that in the general
theory of relativity has been “realized in the most beautiful manner” (1961,
87). For Einstein, such insight into necessity, the revelation of the inherent
mathematical beauty of the cosmos, is the essential aim of science.
Indeed, his attitude evinces a longing for reunion with the whole, an
attempt to reach out to the universe itself. It is not so far from Weil’s ex-
pressed conviction that loving anything less than the universe as a whole is
a form of idolatry:
Beauty is the only finality here below. . . . The love of this beauty proceeds from
God dwelling in our souls and goes out to God present in the universe. . . . This
is true only of universal beauty. With the exception of God, nothing short of the
universe as a whole can with complete accuracy be called beautiful. (Weil 1951,
165)
When he discovered that his gravitational field equations rendered a
previously unexplained disturbance in the orbit of the planet Mercury a
simple matter of geometrical necessity, Einstein relates that “for a few days
I was beside myself with joyous excitement.” One can almost imagine him
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sacrificing a bull to the gods, as Pythagoras is reported to have done when
he discovered the method for finding the mean proportional.
Nevertheless, in our present situation a more radical philosophical and
theological reflection is needed. Weil’s analysis, transcending as it does the
spiritually trivializing compartmentalization and associated instrumental-
ization that degrade our science, points the way. Indeed, we should remind
ourselves that the contemporary divide between the “hard” sciences and
so-called humanities is a modern or at least Renaissance innovation deeply
hostile to the genuine tradition of liberal arts, of which the Pythagoreans
were the progenitors and which in its medieval form included both literary
and mathematical subjects. A revitalization of liberal arts in the true sense
would require the reinstitution of what once went under the name natural
philosophy—not to be simply identified with what today goes under the
name philosophy of science. Although early modern science called itself natural
philosophy, it initiated the historical process by which the latter, tradition-
ally a philosophical discipline distinct from metaphysics, fell into eclipse.
Yet with the advent of modern “positive” science, especially modern sym-
bolic science, natural philosophy is needed more than ever, not only as a
mediating discipline or metaxu between physics and metaphysics but also
as bridge across the contemporary divide between the sciences and the
humanities more generally, and particularly, in light of Weil’s emphasis on
the spiritual crisis of modern science, between science and theology.
Nevertheless, traditional natural philosophy did not countenance the
form of positive or “empiriometric” investigation of nature, distinct from
natural philosophy per se, that defines science in the modern period.24
Indeed, modern science in some sense replaced the object of traditional
natural philosophy, namely, the being of experienced nature, with a con-
structed symbolic-mathematical object, and then implicitly cast this sym-
bolic object as reality. For this reason, only a genuine natural philosophy,
but reconstituted as a bridge to symbolic positive science, can furnish a
truly critical perspective on modern science. It could contribute much to
overcoming the artificial compartmentalization that so undermines science’s
claim to truth and fosters a merely utilitarian or technological conception
of science, devoid of contact with any genuine conception of truth and
goodness.
In connection with Weil’s specific emphasis on the spiritual significance
of physical labor, the symbolic conception of nature presents a particular
challenge. As observed earlier, symbolic mathematics is in a sense itself a
form of technology. Unlike what Weil had in mind when she analyzed
physical labor in terms of the extension of the human body via machines,
modern technology, starting with the steam engine of the industrial revo-
lution, is, like the very symbolic mathematics that renders it possible, based
on automation. For this reason modern machine technology is not so much
about enhancing manual labor by extending the human body as replacing
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the human body with machines. By contrast to the merely instrumental
machines of Weil’s analysis, however, which inertly transmit the force of
material necessity to the body, modern machines run automatically. This
fact fundamentally changes the human relationship to work. If in our present
age of science and technology physical labor is becoming obsolete, at least
in advanced societies, the spiritual implications are from Weil’s point of
view quite grave. This is especially the case when, through its social reifica-
tion, intellectual labor loses its analogy to physical labor.
Accordingly, Weil’s analysis of the spiritual significance of manual labor
requires further elaboration in light of the contemporary phenomenon of
the automation of work. Her reflections on the spiritually destructive as-
pects of factory labor are closely tied both to her personal experience of the
latter’s physical brutality and to a Marxist analysis of alienated labor, where
the worker is used by rather than using the machine.25 Weil chastises Marx
for failing to see that the problem of alienation is distinct from the ques-
tion of who owns the “means of production” (Weil 1958, 1–24), but she
does not seem to have envisioned the possibility that the physical brutality
of factory work might be overcome not by a transformation on the model
of genuine craftsmanship but by a form of automation that leaves alien-
ation intact while potentially removing physical brutality altogether. It may
not be physically brutalizing to press a button turning on a machine that
runs itself, as opposed to operating the machine in the manner of a worker
during the industrial revolution, but the work is meaningless in either case.
Careful reflection is required to distinguish between those tasks in modern
technological civilization for which automation is to be preferred and those
for which manual labor has an essential role and could actually take on the
spiritual significance envisioned by Weil.
Finally, we should not be blind to the mystical possibilities within con-
temporary science. In one sense modern science as symbolic reification is
the very example of personalizing nature, and in so doing foreclosing the
mystical relationship to necessity, but at the same time contemporary math-
ematical science somehow bespeaks a self-transcending necessity of its own,
comes mysteriously bearing gifts of beauty and grace. So, for example,
physicist Heinrich Hertz describes Maxwell’s electromagnetic field theory:
“It is impossible to study this wonderful theory without feeling as if the
mathematical equations had some independent life of their own, as if they
were wiser than ourselves, indeed wiser than their discoverer, as if they
gave forth more than he put into them” (quoted in Park 1988, 356).
We need Weil’s Pythagoreans, but just as much we need our own num-
ber mystics, our Einsteins. We need to pay attention to what they can
teach us about how we in our scientific and technological age can love the
universe the way the Stoics loved it when they said of the divine logos, the





A version of this essay was presented at the American Weil Society Colloquium, Providence,
Rhode Island, 29 April 2006.
1. Besides Morgan’s, the only other general study in English on Weil’s interpretation of
science of which I am aware is James Calder’s “Against Algebra: Simone Weil’s Critique of
Modern Science and its Mathematics” (1987). On Weil’s interpretation of thermodynamics see
Pirrucello 2004. Studies in French include Armengaud 1983; Kaplan 1991; Sourisse 1991; and
Meunier 1996. Pierre Kaplan’s study in particular touches on some of the key issues with which
the present essay is concerned.
2. Here Weil’s position echoes that of Edmund Husserl in The Crisis of the European Sci-
ences (1970), according to which authentic meaning formations must be redeemable in direct
experience of the “life-world.”
3. Sourisse discusses a related opposition in Weil’s thought on mathematics, namely, be-
tween the constructive character of mathematics (after Kant) and its transcendent or ideal
character (after Plato). The “blind necessity” of mathematics is essentially tied to the latter, yet
mathematics paradoxically remains a construction.
4. This contrasts with the earlier period of the scientific revolution, led by planetary as-
tronomy, in which the most notable figures, Copernicus and Kepler, were avid neo-Pythagoreans.
5. Newton asserts in the preface to his Principia ([1934] 1962, I:xvii) that geometry is
founded on “mechanical practice,” a view very much in line with Weil’s analysis here.
6. See Morgan 2005, 37–47, on the development of Weil’s understanding of work, includ-
ing the less idealistic concept in Weil’s later writings in comparison with the earlier dissertation
on Descartes. For purposes of the present discussion, I am reading Weil’s earlier, nonreligious
interpretation of work through the lens of her later reflections, from the final years of her life,
on the relationship between the love of God and the human encounter with the force of mate-
rial necessity. This is justifiable, I believe, in light of Weil’s own conviction that her previous life
and thought had been a preparation for her later mystical encounter with God.
7. In the eighteenth century, work was defined as the product of a force acting through a
distance (expressed algebraically, W = F x D). By the classical work-energy theorem, the kinetic
energy possessed by a moving body is defined by the work required to accelerate the body to a
given velocity, or mv2/2.
8. See on this theme also Calder 1987, 48–50. The affinity of Weil’s thought for the phe-
nomenological tradition in philosophy of science, especially Husserl’s Crisis, cannot escape the
attentive reader of her writings on science. Weil’s thought on science, I believe, can be signifi-
cantly illuminated by the findings of historical phenomenology of science, particularly the
investigations of Jacob Klein in the history of mathematics. At the same time, historical phe-
nomenology of science for its own part could benefit from the spiritual depth of Weil’s treat-
ment of science. A further aim of the present essay, then, is to bring Weil into conversation
with contemporary historical phenomenology of science.
9. Husserl’s locution in The Origin of Geometry (1970, 366), regarding the problematic
status of the “life-world” in modern science.
10. The material in the following section (through page 361) is based on Cosgrove 2008.
11. Klein’s seminal work on the subject is Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of
Algebra (1968), in which he marks the emergence of the modern symbolic conception of num-
ber with Vieta’s Introduction to the Analytical Art (In Artem analyticen Isagoge) of 1591. Several
of Klein’s later essays on the subject are collected in Klein 1985. There is no evidence that Weil
was familiar with Klein’s work.
12. Irrational numbers are numbers, such as the square root of 2, that cannot be expressed
as fractions involving whole numbers.
13. As is customary, for convenience we here consider only a single dimension of space.
14. The velocity of light (c) carries units of distance per unit time, which when multiplied
by t yields distance.
15. When a Cartesian coordinate plane is rotated about its origin by any angle, the distance
between two points s =   x + y2 remains invariant. In a hyperbolic rotation the coordinate axes
are rotated through a “hyperbolic angle,” measured on an arc of a hyperbola rather than an arc
of a circle as in regular trigonometry.  The hyperbolic rotation yields, via analogous hyperbolic
functions sinh and cosinh, the invariant (s2 = y2– x2   or s = 2– 2).  In special relativity, the
spacetime rotation yields s2 = (ct)2– x2, where c = velocity of light.
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16. It is not possible to retain the expression ct, with its units of distance, and continue to
refer to a “spacetime interval,” asserting that time is, after all, being “measured” in units of distance.
Although time can be represented in units of distance, it cannot be measured in units of distance.
17. By the loss of continuity in twentieth-century science Weil means most literally the
indivisible quanta of energy posited by quantum mechanics. More generally, she refers to the
eclipse of the concept of causal necessity (see Calder 1987). For Weil, indeed, twentieth-cen-
tury science exhibits all the essential characteristics of magic—the drive to control nature, lack
of rational insight into how or why its techniques work, esoteric doctrine passed down among
a class of experts, and so forth. In Oppression and Liberty she imagines “a civilization in which
all human activity, in the sphere of labor as in that of speculative theory, was subjected right
down to matters of detail to an altogether mathematical strictness, and that without a single
human being understanding anything at all about what he was doing; the idea of necessity
would then be absent from everybody’s mind, and in far more radical fashion than it is among
primitive tribes which, our sociologists affirm, are ignorant of logic” (1958, 95).
18. The light postulate asserts that the velocity of light is a universal constant. The prin-
ciple of relativity states that the laws of nature are the same for all inertial (nonaccelerated)
frames of reference. If the invariability of the velocity of light is a law of nature, it would seem,
it cannot be the same for frames of reference in motion relative to one another, and thus must
violate the principle of relativity.
19. I can find no evidence in Weil’s writings of direct familiarity with Einstein’s paper.
Kaplan, in his otherwise valuable essay (1991) on Weil and algebra, surprisingly takes Weil’s
interpretation of Einstein at face value.
20. Einstein’s paper “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies” ([1905] 1952) begins
with a philosophical reflection on time, in which he notes that all our measurements of time
rely on determinations of simultaneity (between, for instance, the second hand on my watch
sweeping past 12 and a runner crossing the finish line some distance away). He further ob-
serves that distant simultaneity is never directly perceived, since sense intuition of distant events
relies upon signals transmitted at finite velocity. If distant simultaneity is to be intuited indi-
rectly, Einstein argues, we require an absolute velocity, which may be regarded as unity. Is there
such a velocity? Yes, the velocity of light. This result in turn renders space and time, that is,
measured lengths and measured intervals of time, relative to the frames of reference in which
they are measured.
21. Energy as originally defined in terms of work (the product of force and distance) is a
function of space, which latter is essentially continuous. Weil, as both Morgan and Calder
emphasize, welcomed the reintroduction of discontinuity into scientific thinking, regarding it
as a vital correction to the exclusive emphasis on continuity of classical mechanics, which, had
it been thought through instead of swept under the rug algebraically, could have revitalized
modern science (see Morgan 2005, 53–58; Calder 1987, 58–60). For Weil’s account of quan-
tum mechanics, see “Reflections on Quantum Theory” (Weil 1968, 49–64).
22. Alfred North Whitehead, in fact, argued that perceptual space and time are in effect
quantized. Time, according to him, is an abstraction from the passage of events, and an event is
temporally given to perception solely as a duration or “concrete slab of nature” (Whitehead
[1920] 2004), 53).
23. Gravitational mass is the force associated with the weight of bodies; inertial mass is the
force of resistance to acceleration.
24. The term empiriometric, after Jacques Maritain, highlights the bracketing of metaphys-
ics in modern science via the reconstruction of nature in terms of mathematically idealized
experimental models. On the indispensability of the distinction between, albeit essential relat-
edness of, positive science and natural philosophy, see Maritain 1951. Weil’s negative estimate
of twentieth-century physics suffers somewhat from the absence of a clear distinction between
natural philosophy and positive science. Here is a case, ironic in view of her search for bridges,
where to an extent Weil’s chief virtue as a thinker, namely, her aversion to compartmentalized
knowledge and her desire for a unified view of the whole, works against her. For her objections
to modern science are in reality motivated by a mixture of distinguishable scientific and philo-
sophical considerations. Positive science itself, however, is not always obliged to arrest its progress
while philosophical problems, however genuine, are being resolved.
25. During the period 1934–35 Weil took a number of factory jobs through which, she
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